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For decades critics of the litigation system have bemoaned the delays
and costs of courtroom encounters while working mightily to refine the
system in ways that make it even slower and more expensive. This para-
doxical approach reflects the strengths and weaknesses of legal training.
Skillful in analysis and advocacy, lawyers have recognized those aspects of
trial procedure that can be changed to increase the likelihood of achieving
better results and then engrafted well-intentioned changes onto an already
complex system. At the same time, lawyers' preoccupation with results
and their inadequate appreciation of the need to evaluate the system in
which they function cause them to ignore the adverse consequences of the
litigation process they have constructed. They know that the system is
slow and costly. But they fail to recognize that the solutions they have
developed over the years are a large part of the problem.
The paradox will continue until we realize that constructive change re-
quires not simply adjustments in what we do in the courtroom but funda-
mental rethinking about what we are trying to accomplish there. In my
judgment such rethinking should begin with the concept that underlies so
much of our procedural and substantive law-the concept of fairness. My
premise is that the way we think about fairness, and not any specific re-
sult of our thinking, is a root cause of many of the undesirable aspects of
our modern process of litigation. Our narrow emphasis on perfecting re-
" U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This Comment was origi-
nally presented in somewhat different form as the Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York on November 8, 1984, and printed in The Record, Jan.-Feb. 1985 at
12.
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sults in the case at hand stems directly from our narrow perception of
fairness. A broadened concept of fairness-one that includes fairness not
only toward litigants in an individual case but also to all who use or wish
to use the litigation system and to all who are affected by it-can lead to
changes that directly confront the challenges of delay and expense. Re-
thinking the concept of fairness can produce a litigation system that
broadly achieves fairness.
I. DEFECTS IN THE LITIGATION PROCESS AND THE DIFFICULTY OF
MAKING CHANGES
The common perception that the litigation process is marred by undue
delays and costs is correct. The list of those who suffer from the system's
inadequacies most obviously includes the litigants who wait years for their
day in court. It also includes the unwilling participants in the sys-
tem-jurors who wait for hours that turn into weeks, witnesses who give
up days of work to testify to facts of slight dispute and often less rele-
vance, business executives who endure days of deposition questioning that
yield little to the resolution of disputes in some of which their companies
are not even involved. Perhaps the major impact is on the citizenry in
general, whose attitude toward law and the legal system cannot help but
be profoundly and negatively influenced by a litigation system that
voraciously consumes time and money.
I recognize that there is a lively and increasingly informed debate as to
the appropriate dimensions of our litigation system. Though the popular
position has been to decry the amount of litigation and the time and ex-
pense needed to handle it, strong voices have been raised to assert that our
litigiousness as a society is over-advertised. These voices contend that we
submit fewer matters to court than we did at an earlier time and fewer
than citizens of other countries. Emphasizing the virtues of litigation, they
urge us to facilitate the resolution in court of more disputes to bring the
promise of justice closer to reality.'
It is not my purpose to assess the quantity of our litigation. The object
of my inquiry is the way we structure our litigation system, not its size.
Whether we have too many cases or too few, or even, miraculously, pre-
cisely the right number, there can be little doubt that the system is not
working very well. Too many cases take too much time to be resolved and
impose too much cost upon litigants and taxpayers alike. No one should
1. See, e.g., Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv.
871, 896-927 (1983); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983).
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have to wait five years for a case to come to trial, but many litigants in
this country face this reality.2 Legal expenses should not exceed damage
awards, yet in the asbestos litigation morass, for example, those expenses
total $1.56 for every $1 provided to a victim.' If long delays and high
litigation costs were aberrational, systemic change could safely be avoided.
But we know the problem is more serious. Even if the modern defenders
of our current litigation level are right, systemwide averages should not
obscure the long delays and high costs imposed upon hundreds of
thousands who use or participate in the litigation process and the losses
endured by those who are deterred from seeking redress in court.
Proposals to reduce delays and costs are generally of three types. Some
say we should provide more resources. More courts with more judges and
more court personnel will enable the litigation system to keep pace with
the growth in both population and the legitimate demands to resolve addi-
tional categories of disputes by the judicial process. Others point us in the
opposite direction. They urge us to reduce the volume of cases permitted
to enter the court system. There are two routes to that objective, each with
costs not always acknowledged. The number of court cases can be reduced
either by decreeing that some disputes are no longer to be adjudicated
anywhere, with losses lying where they fall, or by devising alternative
mechanisms for dispute resolution such as arbitration or mediation. Alter-
native mechanisms, of course, do not reduce volume; they only rechannel
it, and the new channels will increasingly claim more resources and de-
velop their own delays and expenses. The third broad approach is to alter
the way we litigate, to make changes in both the substantive and the pro-
cedural law so that a dispute may still be brought into a court but re-
solved more quickly and less expensively.
As our litigation system has evolved, we have pursued all three courses
in varying degrees. We have added judges. We have withdrawn categories
of 'disputes by abolishing causes of action and by diverting cases to less
formal forums. In the hope of saving time and money, we have amended
our substantive and procedural law. Yet for all our efforts, the litigation
system retains its flaws.4
2. Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal
and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 96 (1981).
3. Calculation derived from figures published by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice. See J.
KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G: HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENsES 89, Table 9.3 (1984).
4. Concern about the shortcomings of our litigation process is not a recent phenomenon; Roscoe
Pound, for example, called the problem to our attention in 1906. See Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273 (1964). The example of Pound offers a striking illustration of the gap between calling
attention to a problem and achieving a remedy: His original concerns were echoed seventy years later
at the Pound Conference. See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of
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Why is it that the earnest efforts of so many well-intentioned reformers
yield such minor alterations? There are several answers plainly in view.
One is the institutional resistance to fundamental change. Most institu-
tions are inhospitable to change, and the institutions of the law are espe-
cially so. Since so much of law serves to maintain the strength of estab-
lished arrangements, it is not surprising that the institutions of law tend to
resist innovation, and that the key figures in these institutions fear the
uncertain outcomes that bold changes might bring. In addition, the litiga-
tion system is primarily in the hands of judges and lawyers, whose profes-
sional training has made them experts in minutiae, but left them woefully
ill-equipped to contemplate and implement institutional change. The in-
herent complexity of the litigation system tends to make the system resis-
tant to the influence of outsiders. Nonlawyers, no matter how well-
informed, find it difficult to penetrate the intricacies of the system, and
those who try are frequently rebuffed and reproached by the high priests
of the law. "That's an interesting idea," they are told, "but, of course, it
will not work for reasons too complicated for you to appreciate." And
then, alas, there is the obstacle of pure greed. High litigation costs are fees
to the clients, but they are income to the lawyers. Delays benefit at least
one side in every litigation and sometimes both. Those who profit from
the present system are unlikely to lead the assault on the citadel.
II. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS AND THE NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES
There is another, more fundamental explanation for the time-
consuming and expensive nature of our litigation system: the centrality of
fairness as our governing standard. Fairness is the fundamental concept
that guides our thinking about substantive and procedural law. Fairness
provides the measure by which we gauge the virtues of familiar arrange-
ments and the risks of innovation. We strive continually to reach the fair
outcome, by which we usually mean our best approximation of the correct
outcome-the one in which the facts have been correctly found and the
law correctly applied. We strive to provide each side with a fair opportu-
nity to achieve that outcome, by which we mean the chance to initiate and
pursue any plausible claim or defense, the availability of elaborate means
for producing and testing evidence, and the assurance of appellate review
to enforce the rules of the present system. All of this we do in the name of
fairness.
And so we should! It is assuredly not my purpose to suggest that we
should shift our sights toward unfairness. But it is my contention that our
efforts to reform the litigation process will rarely yield more than spo-
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
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radic, limited, and transient success until we change to some extent the
way we think about that fundamental concept of fairness. The rethinking
I have in mind concerns perspective. As lawyers we think about fairness
in narrow terms. We need to broaden our perspective in three ways. First,
we must learn to evaluate the fairness of each step in the litigation process
not only in the narrow context of its own discrete contribution to the re-
sult, but in the broader context of its incremental value in promoting fair-
ness compared to the inevitable risks of an unfair outcome. Second, we
must include in our assessment of fairness not only fairness of result in
the dispute at hand, but fairness in the broader context for all who use
and wish to use the litigation process. Third, we must think about fairness
of result not only in the familiar context of losses compensable within the
legal framework, but in the broader context of all similar losses that occur
across the whole spectrum of human activity.
A. The Perspective of Trial Fallibility
As lawyers we are trained to focus intently on precise facts and precise
issues. We tend to think about one thing at a time. Professor Thomas
Reed Powell is believed to have said: "If you can think about one thing
that is inextricably related to another thing without thinking about the
thing to which it is related, you will have learned to think like a lawyer."
An elegant conception, to be sure, and a skill well learned by the best of
our craft! Such narrow thinking usefully promotes habits of careful analy-
sis, but it is a distinct handicap for making value judgments about the
intrinsic worth of each item being examined. When we think about the
fairness of each step in the litigation process, such narrow thinking is a
substantial barrier to reform.
Whenever we consider procedural rules, we tend to think only of their
supposed virtue in helping to achieve a fair result. We have a conception
of attainable fairness, and so we are persuaded to accept all sorts of de-
vices that hold any prospect of enhancing the likelihood of a fair outcome.
I will assume for the moment that our procedures promote fairness or at
least tend to do so. But their true worth cannot be soundly assessed unless
we acknowledge the inherent limitations on our ability to achieve fairness
in the course of litigation. That process is largely an exercise in determin-
ing facts, and the blunt reality is that our ability to tell where the truth
resides in any disputed matter is always limited. Versions of the truth
come from witnesses who err in their perceptions. Even what they per-
ceive correctly, they sometimes fail to remember accurately. What they
remember accurately, they sometimes are unable to report clearly. What
they are capable of reporting clearly is sometimes tinged with subtle bias
or wholly distorted by deliberate perjury. When accurate testimony is
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presented, it is sometimes misperceived by juries and judges. Finally, even
the most conscientious juries and judges, hearing and perceiving the most
fairly presented versions of the facts, will on occasion reach the wrong
conclusions. Anyone who has had to choose between two conflicting ver-
sions of the facts will admit, at least to himself, that sometimes he had no
sound basis for deciding whom to believe. Trials are not clinical investiga-
tions, performed under laboratory conditions. They are human confronta-
tions, subject to all the normal risks of human error and with the risks
compounded by the dramatic intensity of the event, the contentiousness of
the adversary process, and the distortions that sometimes arise from dis-
parity in talent and resources of the contending sides.
I point out these shortcomings not in despair. The courtroom trial is a
marvelous invention, yielding in most instances a useful approximation of
the truth and adjusting disputes peacefully and with a vital aura of legiti-
macy. But its fallibility is inevitable, and we ought to have that fallibility
in mind when we decide what facets of the trial process are needed to
achieve the degree of fairness we want.
The risk of fallibility can lead us in either of two opposite directions.
We could say, as do many in our profession, that the risks of fallibility
should make us more determined than ever to insist upon the most metic-
ulous trial procedures, especially those designed to guard against the very
factors that contribute to the risk of unfair outcomes. It is a powerful
argument, and it ought to carry the day for some procedures, regardless of
their time and cost. But the opposite argument deserves our attention as
well. Since the trial outcome will not always be fair, we need not insist
upon time-consuming and costly procedures simply because they offer
some slight chance of promoting fairness, especially when the virtue of the
procedure is a matter of faith and not demonstration. If we are trying to
determine the depth of the snowfall in our backyard, it makes sense to use
a yardstick, even though our measurement might be distorted because the
wind might have blown some extra snow to the spot we measured or
blown a little away. But it would not make sense to purchase an elaborate
device to count the snowflakes. Too often when we think about achieving
fairness through procedural devices, we are counting the snow-
flakes-refining our practices in an endeavor that at best can only approx-
imate the ultimate determinations we wish to make.
Of course, the risk of error in fact-finding is more than the risk of
missing the right answer by a slight degree; in some cases the risk is
reaching the absolutely wrong answer. The person who should win some-
thing may receive nothing; the person who deserves nothing may receive
something; the innocent person may be convicted; the guilty person may
go free. Of all these risks, the one we properly strive the hardest to avoid
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is the risk of convicting the innocent. Yet even in guarding against -this
most dreadful prospect, we ought to assess the worth of our procedures in
the context of trial fallibility. The celebrated collections of cases where the
innocent were convicted are not filled with examples of failure to comply
with elaborate procedures. The innocent are convicted primarily because
eyewitnesses were mistaken. Some are convicted because a key witness
deliberately lied. A few are convicted because incriminating circumstances
led to a conclusion about the defendant's knowledge or intent that was
simply incorrect.5 Our procedures offer very little prospect of diminishing
these risks. That does not mean the procedures are without merit in crim-
inal and civil trials. They play some part in minimizing some risks of
error. My point is simply that an assessment of their worth-their real
contribution to fairness-ought to be made in the context of the inevitable
and significant causes of trial fallibility.
B. The Perspective of System Fairness
A second critical flaw in the way we think about fairness is that, al-
though we scrupulously strive to achieve a fair outcome in the individual
dispute, we rarely consider how to be fair to all who use or would like to
use the litigation system. Not only do we focus on fairness of result, we
assess procedural devices only for their tendency to affect the result, with
little or no inquiry as to their incremental benefit. Even when we come to
some considered assessment that a procedural device provides a significant
benefit, we do not pursue the more searching inquiry into whether the
benefit to be achieved in promoting fairness of result is worth the loss of
system fairness, with its attendant social cost upon all who use or would
like to use the litigation system.
It is not that we fail to understand the elements of cost-benefit analysis.
When the issue is the worth of some rule that promotes important values
at the risk of impairing others, we normally recognize the need to make
an assessment of the overall impact of the rule. The exclusionary rule is
defended by those who believe that its deterrent effect on police miscon-
duct outweighs the significance of some number of unprosecuted crimes;6
it is opposed by those who weigh the competing concerns differently.7 Al-
though both sides have scant basis for measuring either the deterrence the
5. Professor Borchard's well-known collection of 65 trials that convicted an innocent person ilus-
trates the point that erroneous convictions are usually produced by erroneous testimony. In these
trials, an eyewitness was honestly mistaken in 35 instances, and a key witness deliberately lied in 19
cases. See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xiii, xxv
(1932).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3437, 3443-44 & nn.13, 14 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498-500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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rule achieves or the extent of crime it tolerates,' they at least purport to
make the balance. With procedural steps that affect the time and cost of
the litigation process, however, we not only make little effort to quantify
the benefits, we too often fail to recognize the need to balance the benefits
for particular outcomes and the social costs for the system as a whole.
Fairness of result monopolizes our attention.
Once again, the narrowness of our thinking stems from the nature of
our legal training. As lawyers we are taught to consider the dispute at
hand and not the operation of the legal system in which the dispute arises
and is resolved. Legal training from the first day in law school throughout
a lawyer's career focuses on discrete controversies. We learn the facts of a
particular case. We learn the principles applicable to a particular set of
facts. We analyze the merits of a particular result. We examine the rea-
soning in a particular opinion. But always our focus is on a dispute and
not on the consequences for the litigation process.
Furthermore, our training in the law rarely includes exposure to the
rudimentary measurement arts of the social sciences. The rewards of prac-
tice and too often of the academy are bestowed almost exclusively on those
who excel in the traditional fields of legal inquiry. There is an army of
litigators for every trained legal administrator. There is a battalion of con-
stitutional scholars for every serious student of the litigation system. Al-
though we were all taught the intricacies of civil procedure, we seldom
examined the volume of litigation, its social cost, or the techniques for
examining the litigation process and determining the effects of change.
My concern is not with the pros and cons of any particular procedural
devices, but with the way we think about their virtue. Nevertheless, a few
aspects of procedure are worth mentioning, not to demonstrate that they
are dispensable, but simply to invite thinking about them in a different
light-thinking about the fairness they achieve, first, in the context of the
inevitable fallibility of the trial process, and second, in the context of the
operation of the litigation system as a whole.'
I doubt that we should retain our current rule that a pleading should
remain in court if any conceivable set of facts might support its allega-
tions. We need not return to the days of Chitty's pleadings, but we could
insist that complaints contain assertions of the essential facts. When the
claim survives dismissal, I doubt that discovery should be routinely per-
8. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 665,
709 (1970) (noting absence of "empirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule").
9. For a recent analysis of the litigation system that calls for systemic reform but that does not
consider the fairness question, see Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 1 (1984).
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mitted.10 Where discovery is needed, I doubt that depositions should be
permitted beyond two or three, limited to one hour, that interrogatories
should be permitted beyond five or ten, and that any but precisely identi-
fied documents need be searched for and produced. Once discovery is com-
plete, I doubt that we should confine the use of summary judgments as
rigidly as we now do. In a case that proceeds to trial, I doubt that jury
selection should be the elaborate process it is in most state courts. I doubt
that witnesses must always be examined through question and answer
techniques; a narrative would often be more informative, more readily un-
derstood, and quicker. I doubt that trial witnesses are needed at all in
some cases; juries could decide some disputes simply from the contending
claims of the lawyers, as in the non-binding summary trials now being
experimented with in the Northern District of Ohio."1 Once a verdict has
been reached, I doubt that appeals as of right must be available in all civil
cases. Indeed, I doubt that the adversary process itself needs to be used
uniformly across the entire spectrum of civil litigation.
There are risks in all of these suggestions. A conclusory complaint, if
allowed to remain in court, might prevail upon full discovery and trial.
One document disclosed in a search of scores of filing cabinets may be
important. For lack of one more deposition, a witness might not be effec-
tively cross-examined. A case rejected on summary judgment might, upon
trial, prove successful. A venireman not subjected to elaborate voir dire
might enter the jury box with insurmountable bias. Narrative testimony
might include impermissible facts. Live testimony might be decisive. An
appeal might result in a retrial with a different outcome. Of course, these
possibilities exist. Our litigation procedures are not vulnerable because
they are useless; they deserve reexamination because they may not be
worth having.
In many cases, the lack of these additional safeguards will not affect the
result. The extra document may have no real bearing on an outcome de-
termined by all the vagaries and occasional venalities of witnesses. The
impermissible fact mentioned in narrative testimony may be lost in the
welter of pertinent information. Some procedural protections may even be
detrimental to a fair result. The time spent to interrogate potential jurors
may weed out the conscientious ones who admit to bias and would strive
mightily to lay it aside, but send into the jury box the artful perjurers
whose biases were undetected by the amateur psychoanalysis we call voir
dire.
But what of the instances when abandoning or revising a procedure
10. For a more detailed reexamination of current discovery practices, see id. at 22-24.
11. For a discussion of the procedures used in these trials, see Lambros & Shunk, The Summary
Jury Trial, 29 CLEvL. ST. L. REv. 43 (1980).
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would alter the outcome? If our focus is only on fairness of outcome, the
inquiry is easy. We retain any procedure that could conceivably increase
the likelihood of obtaining a fair result. That principle has been the foun-
dation on which we have built the present structure of our litigation sys-
tem. But if our sense of fairness extends beyond the outcome, then addi-
tional analysis is necessary. We should not, for example, retain extensive
jury voir dire simply because many lawyers are convinced that it has some
benefit in promoting fairness of outcome in their cases. We must first
make some serious assessment of its real worth in ferreting out bias. We
must then determine whether that incremental benefit to the litigants in
each case justifies the delays and consequent loss of fairness to all others
affected by the litigation process-including those incarcerated in pretrial
detention awaiting their chance to have a trial.
Fairness of system is not some abstraction competing against the flesh
and blood claims of fairness of outcome. Fairness of system reflects the
aggregate impact of the litigation process upon the lives of all actual and
potential litigants. It is concerned with the money each person is obliged
to spend to achieve an outcome, with the time each person must invest
until an outcome is reached, and with losses uncompensated because the
litigation process is rightly perceived as involving too much time and
money to justify its use.
C. The Perspective of Those with Losses Outside the System of Legal
Liability
A third deficiency in the way we think about fairness is our tendency to
consider fairness solely in the context of matters amenable to litigation
instead of in the broader context of similar events of the real world. This
aspect of thinking about fairness implicates substantive standards, rather
than procedural devices. Some substantive standards seem eminently fair
when viewed within the context of the litigation process. Though we rec-
ognize that it takes time and money to determine whether a given legal
standard has been met, we instinctively conclude that the benefit is worth
the costs because we are looking at the standard as it applies only to those
within the framework of actual or potential litigation. But if we look be-
yond that framework, the intrinsic fairness of some standards might seem
less compelling and their benefits might not always seem worth the social
costs of the litigation.
Let me explore an example from the field of compensation for injury.
When lawyers think about the operation of our system for compensating
injuries, they tend to think only about those misfortunes compensable ac-
cording to the rules of law-primarily the rules of tort liability. The very
topic conjures up images of the accident victim. Because we are used to
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the substantive rules of liability, we assume that the victim who suffers
physical impairment should receive a significant sum of money to compen-
sate for various consequences of injury. A victim should receive money for
medical costs, for lost wages, for the fact of disability, and for pain and
suffering. I distinguish the fact of disability from pain and suffering for
reasons that will shortly become apparent.12 Even to suggest that some of
these elements are inappropriate for compensation is to venture onto he-
retical ground. But if disbelief might be suspended for just a moment, the
process of reexamination could begin by first broadening the context in
which the appropriateness of compensation is to be assessed.
Suppose we broaden the context to include not just those whose impair-
ments stem from tortious wrongs but all persons who have physical im-
pairments regardless of the cause of their disability. We include those in-
jured by their own carelessness, those accidentally injured through no
one's fault, those whose impairments stem from birth defects or disease or
war. In that universe of persons, each with an equivalent degree of serious
physical impairment, what is an appropriate measure of compensation?
As a general matter, our society has agreed to pay a portion of a person's
medical expenses if he is poor or elderly."3 If the impairment is so serious
that the person is totally incapable of work, we are also willing to provide
some wage earners with a modest disability payment,1" compensating for
a portion of lost wages and perhaps, to a very limited extent, for the fact
of disability. If the disability arises from military service, even if the per-
son is not totally disabled, we provide medical care and a scheduled level
of disability payments. 5 And as to those in this broader universe, whether
or not eligible for medical or disability benefits, what compensation do we
afford for their pain and suffering? The answer of course is none. Yet if
pain and suffering are fit subjects for compensation, how can we so
blithely fail to compensate the pain and suffering of millions who have the
double misfortune of a serious physical impairment and no basis for a
lawsuit that falls within traditional notions of legal liability?
12. Though courts sometimes speak of pain and suffering damages as including disability, e.g.,
Gretchen v. United States, 618 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1980), the distinction between an award for
pain and suffering and an award for the fact of disability has been recognized in cases that distinguish
between pain and suffering and impairment of enjoyment of life, e.g., Petition for U.S. Steel Corp.,
436 F.2d 1256, 1265-67 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971), or between pain and
suffering and permanent injuries, e.g., Traylor v. United States, 396 F.2d 837, 839-40 (6th Cir.
1968). Juries are frequently instructed to consider damages both for an injury and for pain and
suffering. See, e.g., NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CIVIL 2:280 (1974) (allowing jury
to make an award for "injury" and for "conscious pain and suffering"); id. at 2:280A (Supp. 1984)
(authorizing award "for the injury and for the conscious pain and suffering caused by the injury").
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396p (1982) (federal health insurance for aged and disabled).
14. See id. § 423 (federal disability insurance benefits).
15. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 610 (1982) (federal health care and disability compensation for veter-
ans injured in line of duty).
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No doubt it seems bizarre even to suggest that all those with serious
impairments that cause them to endure pain and suffering ought to receive
some compensation on that account. I am not urging that their pain and
suffering should be compensated. On the contrary, I raise the point only
to provide a perspective on the correlative suggestion I do make, namely,
that pain and suffering arising within the traditional context of tort liabil-
ity should not be compensated. I make this suggestion as an example of
the type of fundamental rethinking that I believe is necessary. The perti-
nence of this example stems from the effect of pain and suffering damages
on the frequency of jury trials.
I strongly suspect that, of all the compensable elements of traditional
torts, the element of pain and suffering is often the most significant deter-
minant of whether a negligence case will be settled or tried. Even if un-
sure of what the jury will do in a particular case, lawyers are frequently
in remarkable agreement in estimating the probability of a plaintiff's ver-
dict on liability and hence in providing a mathematical basis for determin-
ing a fair settlement once the likely damage award has been fairly esti-
mated. When they turn to that likely award, they can reach agreement
fairly easily on medical costs already incurred and even on a reasonable
estimate of future medical expenses. Past wages are rarely in dispute. Fu-
ture wages are sometimes in dispute, but few settlement negotiations
break down on that point. Lawyers frequently agree even upon the likely
award for a disability. What propels many litigants past the settlement
table and into the courtroom is the high stakes game of pain and suffering
damages. To be sure, uncertainty as to whether the jury will award five
thousand or five hundred thousand sometimes promotes a settlement be-
cause neither side wants to take the chance that its worst fears will be
realized. But in other cases the parties go to trial because they have deter-
mined that the risk of a disappointingly low (or high) award of pain and
suffering damages is worth the chance of obtaining a successful outcome.
If only their time and money were at stake, the choice should be theirs.
But if it could be demonstrated, as I suspect, that the availability of pain
and suffering damages induces litigants in a significant number of in-
stances to try a case they would otherwise settle, then the burdens on the
litigation process must be carefully assessed and balanced against the in-
terests of individual plaintiffs. That balancing will be incomplete if all we
think about is the traditional entitlement of tort victims to damages for
pain and suffering. But if we expand the context and think about all who
suffer similar misfortune, we may begin to wonder whether a payment for
pain and suffering, which goes only to tort victims, is really as fair as we
have always assumed. At least if we think about all those with a similar
impairment, we will make a more dispassionate assessment of the worth
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of pain and suffering damages. We will then be in a position to judge
whether fairness requires this component of a tort recovery at all or per-
haps only up to some specified limit,16 and whether it makes sense to
impose on our litigation system the costs of deciding which plaintiffs
should receive such damages and in what amounts.
We should also take a hard look at lost future income. In the context of
tort litigation, we assume that it is only fair to give the injured executive
full compensation for the loss of his high salary, while awarding the in-
jured tradesman only his more modest lost wages. But the executive would
have been just as deprived of his income if the cause of his disabling in-
jury had not been a negligent, fully-insured motorist, but instead a fall in
his own bathtub or a crippling disease. We might not think that fairness
requires an award of all lost income for the injured executive if we
thought about him in the context of all persons with a similar impair-
ment. And we might well conclude that a ceiling on recoverable future
wages would be appropriate in all tort cases if it were shown to reduce
the number of trials. Similar considerations might justify scheduled
awards for the fact of disability, or at least ceilings on this component of
damages.
Of course, more is at stake in assessing the components of tort recovery
than fairness to the injured person and burdens upon the litigation pro-
cess. The elements of a damage award may play some part in the deter-
rent effect of tort law, especially in products liability. But in many con-
texts deterrence is unlikely. I doubt, for example, that many motorists
take an extra measure of care because the damages a jury is permitted to
award the victim of their negligence can include a generous sum for pain
and suffering. Even where the possibility of deterrence is realistic, it
should not automatically outweigh other considerations. We should not
impose heavy burdens on our litigation system without some basis for esti-
mating whether these burdens are justified by whatever reduction in acci-
dents results from the prospect of high damage awards.
Once we begin to think about fairness to those who suffer losses not in
narrow terms of losses traditionally compensable in lawsuits, but of simi-
lar losses suffered by all, our thinking about the litigation process will
16. There is precedent for limiting pain and suffering damages. In 1972, New Zealand, as part of
a comprehensive reform of its accident compensation scheme, limited such damages to $7500 in New
Zealand currency. See Accident Compensation Act 1972, [1972] N.Z. Stat. No. 43, § 120. The limit
was subsequently raised to $10,000. See Accident Compensation Act 1982, [1982] N.Z. Stat. No. 181,
§ 79. For a commentary on the pain and suffering provisions of the original act, see T. IsoN, ACCI-
DENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEA.AND SCHEME 64-68 (1980). Similarly,
in malpractice cases, California has statutorily limited pain and suffering awards to $250,000. See
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1985). The
California Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of this measure. See Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
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produce significant changes. We may decide that certain losses or compo-
nents of losses that we now assume must be the subject of litigation can be
removed from litigation entirely. In some instances, the losses would sim-
ply lie where they fall, with the option of private insurance available.
Alternatively, compensation for loss could be provided by social insurance
at modest, scheduled levels of recovery.1" Even if existing grounds of lia-
bility are not altered, we might consider placing ceilings on damages, ceil-
ings that we candidly recognize would provide substantially less than the
full recovery we have traditionally assumed should be awarded. We might
also want to take a hard look at treble damages in antitrust law and puni-
tive damages in general. What are the benefits of these recoveries and how
many unnecessary trials do they stimulate? Limited awards niight achieve
sufficient benefits with fewer burdens.
My primary concern is not to argue the case for particular changes
.such as limiting pretrial discovery or eliminating damages for pain and
suffering. Indeed, debate over any one change may too easily obscure my
underlying point. My concern throughout is not what we should do about
our procedural and substantive rules, but the way we should think about
them, particularly the way we might think about the fairness they are
designed to achieve.
III. A LIMITED JUDICIAL ROLE
The rethinking I have suggested might profitably be undertaken by all
concerned with the litigation system, legislators and judges, practitioners
and academics. All contribute to the nature of the litigation process, and
all have a significant role in diagnosing our current problems and formu-
lating and reacting to proposals for change. Whether the ultimate imple-
mentation of change is more in the domain of the legislator or the judge,
however, is another matter. For most changes, revision achieved by rule
will be preferable to revision accomplished in the resolution of a particu-
lar lawsuit. Most basic standards ought to emanate from legislators,
though rulemaking by judges sometimes plays a useful role. Revision ac-
complished in the decision of a case ought to occur infrequently. But
changes that vitally affect the litigation system have been made in individ-
ual decisions and can legitimately be revised in the same way. It was the
Supreme Court's decison in Conley v. Gibson"8 that authoritatively com-
mitted us to the proposition that a complaint must remain in court if any
17. We have already begun to venture into this mode of thinking: Through workers' compensa-
tion we have altered the traditional standards of tort recovery for those injured at the workplace,
providing certainty of recovery in exchange for limits on the amount of recovery. Other losses are
amenable to similar arrangements.
18. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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set of facts can conceivably be imagined that might support its allegations.
It would be entirely within the judicial function for a subsequent decision
to make some adjustment in that doctrine."9
The legitimate role of the judge in permitting considerations of fairness
throughout the litigation system to influence the outcome of the case at
hand was brought sharply into focus recently in a case from the Southern
District of New York that found its way to the Second Circuit. In Mallis
v. Bankers Trust Co.," ° Judge Carter was asked to set aside a plaintiff's
verdict and order a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. Through no fault of the defendant, the case
had been tried twice and was then seven years old. Judge Carter candidly
acknowledged that the time and cost already devoted to the litigation was
a substantial and perhaps decisive factor in his discretionary decision to
deny the motion."1 On appeal Judge Lumbard, expressed the view of the
panel that "the passage of time, by itself, is a consideration which should
not have been given any weight in denying the new trial motion.""2 I
disagreed and endeavored to explain why, at least on a discretionary rul-
ing such as this, the trial judge was entitled to weigh the time and re-
sources already devoted to the case.2 8 Interestingly, the panel unanimously
affirmed the plaintiff's judgment, perhaps indicating that all of us in some
fashion shared Judge Carter's view that a third trial would have been an
unwarranted burden on the court system. Whether or not my view of the
matter was sound, the case illustrates that concerns about the time litiga-
tion takes are not likely at present to receive explicit approval as the basis
for decision of specific cases.
The views of the majority in Mallis are entirely understandable. They
reflect a natural aversion to what may seem to be no more than arguments
of expediency. They also reflect, I suspect, a tacit acceptance of the pre-
sent state of our litigation system, or at least a view, common throughout
the judiciary, that with the system already overloaded with so many cases,
the additional time to try one more case, or to accord one more procedural
step to one more litigant, will add only a drop of water to the flood. I urge
the opposing point of view because I believe that what is at stake is far
more than a matter of expediency. We must think hard about ways to
save time and money in the litigation system so that the system can func-
19. Judges of the lower federal courts have already made some selective inroads on the doctrine.
They have, for example, required substantial fact pleading in complaints alleging civil rights conspira-
des. E.g., Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Powell v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964).
20. 717 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1983).
21. See id. at 696 (Newman, J., concurring) (discussing lower court opinion).
22. Id. at 692 (Lumbard, J.).
23. Id. at 695-700 (Newman, J., concurring).
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tion properly and thereby provide justice for all who wish to use it or are
affected by it. We need to rethink our conception of fairness not simply to
save time and money but to distribute fairness more evenly. In this regard,
each of us might find it useful to follow the approach of John Rawls and
consider, from behind "the veil of ignorance," '24 what type of a litigation
system we would prefer to have if we did not know what our role in the
system might be-whether litigant, witness, juror, lawyer, judge, or citi-
zen. A view of the litigation system from that disinterested perspective
would yield fresh insights into what we mean and ought to mean by
fairness.
IV. PREREQUISITES FOR CHANGE
Once we are willing to rethink the concept of fairness, three things
must be done to enhance the likelihood of bold changes in the procedure
and substance of litigation. First, we must vastly expand our efforts to
gather the empirical data necessary for sound evaluations of the real
worth of each component of our litigation system and for hard calculations
of the burdens upon the entire system. Thus far we have made only the
most rudimentary attempts to assess the value of what we do in the litiga-
tion process. We operate primarily by intuition, reenforced by the comfort
of tradition. We need to know, for example, what degree of benefit is
provided by extended voir dire examination of jurors and at what cost. We
need to have a sense of how many complaints would be dismissed at the
threshold if some degree of fact pleading were generally required and how
many of these complaints would ultimately have been meritorious if not
dismissed. We need to know how many trials are precipitated by the pros-
pect of pain and suffering damages and what results would be achieved by
substituting partially compensatory alternative arrangements.
In all areas of social endeavor, specific proposals for change are inade-
quately subjected to quantitative assessment. The litigation system is not
unique in the paucity of available pertinent data. We have learned to
count the cases, but we have wholly inadequate data for determining the
worth and cost of each step in the litigation process. Although personal
judgments will always play a part in even the most sophisticated of empir-
ical evaluations, we need not rely solely on intuition and habit. Surely we
can do better in finding out the value and the cost of what we are doing in
our courtrooms.
Second, as our empirical data are assembled, we will need to take the
further step of experimenting with changes. As law has been in the main
inhospitable to change, it has been especially leery of experimentation.
24. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
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For those trained in the law, uniformity of procedure is a watchword,
reenforced by ethical concerns and by the values, if not requirements, of
the Equal Protection Clause. The appropriate bounds of experimentation
in the law is a topic unto itself.25 Without essaying the complexities, I
simply note the irony that the medical profession has made enormous pro-
gress by experimenting with matters of life and death, while we in the
law shun experimental ways of deciding matters of property.
Third, I suggest that fundamental rethinking about the nature of fair-
ness in our litigation system will not progress very far until legal educa-
tion decides to place these issues in the curriculum and to recognize them
as subjects of serious scholarship. The next generation of lawyers will
determine how profoundly we deal with the burdens of litigation. The law
schools will determine whether that generation is interested in reform,
creative in its thinking, and equipped to design and implement significant
changes.
CONCLUSION
We need not wait for the combined effects of empirical research, exper-
imentation, and academic attention to begin the reexamination of our legal
process. Each of us has the capacity to rethink what our litigation system
ought to be. The process of litigation is a product of the mind. Its im-
provement can emerge from creative thinking. The current condition of
the litigation process demands that we think hard about the way we liti-
gate and the matters worth litigating. Such thinking must include consid-
eration of what we mean and ought to mean by "fairness," for our con-
ception of fairness has significantly shaped our ideas about what should
happen in our courtrooms. If we are to think anew about the litigation
process, we must first be willing to rethink our conception of fairness.
That task will be unsettling for some, but worthwhile for all.
25. See FED. JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMM. ON ExPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, Ex-
PERIMENTATION IN THE LAw (1981).
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